Introduction
The Scientific Committee has kindly asked the first author to comment on the recent move of primate ethologists into the domain of social cognition. Specifically, they have raised the question whether this movement has been "truly innovative". As the speaker is a largely postproductive male he decided that his lifetime scientific fitness could not be overly affected by accepting this interesting but thorny assignment.
The social cognition move seems to have originated in observations of the 1950ies that a primate can use another as a social tool. In hamadryas baboons, for example, subordinate females were seen to induce a dominant male to attack an opponent superior to themselves by the routine 
Why should field workers want to investigate cognition?
For the 30 years since the foundations of cognitive science were laid, primate field workers left cognition and intelligence to the laboratory psychologists. Why should we change that and try to master a rather difficult discipline that is alien to our concepts and methods? One reason is that animal psychologists were not too interested and successful in exploring social cognition. The sign languages taught to chimps, for example, contain no sign for kin, enemy, male, mother, or appeasement, and the work on sea lions and parrots keep neatly in this wake. Mainly, however, the new interest stems from the assumption that cognitive abilities were evolved and are ontogenetically modified in "natural environments". The concept "mother-child relationship" was examined by simultaneous discrimination and match-to-sample tasks. In one example, the subject was trained to consistently select slides of the same two females, which happened to be mother and daughter. The task was learned, but this the subject could have done in two ways: By simply associating the two individuals without reference to their relationship, or by learning that the solution was a mother-offspring dyad. In transfer tests she was now presented with slides of 14 other mother-offspring pairs of the colony and slides of dyads with other relationships; in all 14 tests she selected the mother-offspring dyads rather than the controls as positive, even in cases where the offspring was adult and older than the subject herself. DASSER concluded that the subjects had some concept of "mother and child" which they spontaneously applied to the positive training dyads.
Could this result not be obtained by observation in the field? Could one not find that a subject behaves toward all mother-infant dyads in a specific way, thus showing that he puts them in separate class, as if one wanted to know what characters defined the class of males for sticklebacks by a specific behavior directed at males? In principle, yes. But the approach would be weaker: First, it is unlikely that primates respond to a type of relationship among others by a specific behavior. Second, the members of the dyad would always have to be together in these real life tests, and their specific interaction at the moment would affect the subject. Third, there would be no easy controls for finding those still unknown aspects of the mother-child dyad that are used as criteria for the concept by the macaque subject. That is why TINBERGEN used dummies when he examined what was a male for a stickleback.
Social cognition as knowledge of mental states in group members
The above example concerns one aspect of the organization of primate knowledge about social structure. In the social cognition move, the prevailing interest is in whether primates manipulate their conspecifics, whether they deceive and conceal, have "politics" suddenly stopped and stared into a bush. The chaser immediately ceased his pursuit and stared as well. When no predator or intruder emerged, the chase was not resumed. Let us assume that the observer was correct in his judgement that there was not the slightest external stimulus in the bush that could have caught the agent's attention. In a simplified way, one can then distinguish the following levels of knowledge in the agent:
There is a zero level, at which the actor has no knowledge of social effects of his staring. We unexpectedly encountered this level in 1967 during enclosure experiments on hamadryas baboons (KUMMER et al., 1974). A male was admitted to a pair consisting of another male and his female after observing them for 15 min. The late-comers, called the rivals, did not fight for the female, but they scratched a lot, looked at the sky, fiddled with stones, and occasionally stared into the distance as if they saw something exciting. The same males never did this when they were placed in the role of the pair male. The data suggested that the star-ing was attention redirected away from the pair, at which the rivals avoided looking. The staring never caused the pair to search for the imaginary leopard or eagle; they were not deceived. Observational support for this zero-interpretation would be contextual evidence of a conflict. Evidence that the staring occurred independently of any benefit for the agent would require experimental controls. The above experiment had at least the advantage of producing the conflict with a regularity that allowed a qualitative judgement. (To exemplify the complexities of interpretation, a much more demanding interpretation of the target's nonresponse may be mentioned: The rival could "do something else" because he believes that the owner believes that the rival is interested in the female, and in order to disprove the owner's belief. If the owner interpreted this as an honest message he would not stare into the bush with the rival but would do nothing, as in our experiments.)
Next, we could hypothesize, on level 1, that the baboon knows by trial and error learning that his staring can stop an opponent. This is not yet cognition; the baboon only knows that his conspecific will respond with a specific behavior to a specific action by himself.
But if he now generalized to staring at a bush when a rival groomed an oestrous female, or to stopping an attacker by a simulated find of hidden food, we would attribute him with organized knowledge independent of context, that is with cognition, level 2. He would know: "If I do anything that causes B to orient he will stop doing whatever he was doing". His knowledge is organized. To accept this cognitive interpretation we would want to see the baboon generalize his knowledge to new contexts and to cross-connect many undesirable behaviors of his targets to many interrupting behaviors of his own. To be sure that he had not learned each combination by trial and error, we would have to observe the complete history of such stopping behavior in a sample of individuals, or, more realistically, to control the ontogenetic inputs in an experiment. The procedure is clear at least in principle and not essentially different from ethological methods in ontogeny.
The social cognition move, however, is interested in yet another level of interpretation, here labelled level 3: Not only that the subject has knowledge but that he attributes knowledge to others. The deceiving baboon might know that his conspecific has mental states such as intentions to attack and beliefs about predators; states which he, the deceiver can influence by his behavior. Thus, the deceiver would intend to induce the target to believe that a predator is in the bush and thus induce a change in the target's intention to attack. How could one operationalize such an interpretation, for example that a baboon attributes intentions to his conspecifics? As in the DASSER study, one could experimentally expose the subject primate to behavior sequences, preferably video scenes, and then see whether it forms a class of scenes that coextends with our category of intention. The weakness of this approach is that we cannot conceive and therefore cannot test for another kind of intention than our own. The difficulty of operationalizing mental states attributed by other species is staggering, but the anecdote may be hopeless. WHITEN & BYRNE (1988) are quite aware of all these and other levels of interpretations, but they still hope for a major role of anecdote. We believe that the necessary controls are principally unobtainable in the field.
Demanding interpretation and intentional language
Research into social cognition requires the thinking in alternative interpretations, and experiments are essential final steps. These are largely accepted, almost trivial rules, yet they are being disregarded. Why?
Three recent historical developments in ethology come to mind: 1. Unwarranted terminology in Primatology. With "Agonistic Buffering" and later "Reconciliation" it became acceptable to name a behavior by its function even when there was no evidence that something was buffered or that someone was reconciliated. The old ethological rule was to label a behavior by a descriptive name. We now see the same inflation of terms in cognition: "Politics" and " Tactical Nevertheless, all these high claims have had good effects as well. If I find a bottle labelled "Chateau Lafite-Rothschild" I am more motivated to ascertain whether that is really true than when the label says: "Fermented fruit juice of undetermined quality". The claims have fired imagination and joined forces with our emotional hope that our animals are really clever.
Even so, it seems that we must argue once more for principles that seemed accepted.
Are experiments unavoidable?
Is the experiment really unavoidable for mental interpretations? Can the field observer contribute nothing but heuristically interesting anecdotal leads?
Lucky circumstances could convince us by observation alone that nonhuman primates attribute mental states to their conspecifics. PREMACK (1988) gives the lovely example of the fishing pond. The owner, in front of a boy standing ready at a distance with his rod, might stir up the water to show the absence of fish, and he might fish himself for hours without catching anything. If we as observers are certain that the owner knows that no fish are there, we can infer that the owner tries to install (and therefore attributes) a mental state in the boy, namely the belief that no fish are in the pond. We will do this if nothing supports the notion that the owner tried to affect only the behavior of the boy with the rod, such as threatening him.
Unfortunately, non-human primates have not been observed to perform behavior that could only be interpreted as a demonstration to another's mind. Even for the more modest goal of mapping an animals's knowledge about his society, there is a prerequisite that is not easily met without experimentation. The researcher must have as much knowledge as the animal subject about the relevant external object or event. I cannot judge the knowledge which a rat displays by running a maze unless I know that maze myself. I can infer a baboon's knowledge only to the extent that my knowledge of our common environment somehow overlaps with his. Ideally I should know more about his world than he does. Our technical knowledge overlaps sufficiently with that of a chimp to infer his knowledge about tool use. But with respect to the social maze he lives in, we are handicapped by ignorance. We do not sufficiently know what happened among our subjects last night and last year, and we lack much of their hard-wired social percepts and their acquired socialization. Our respective ignorance is, of course, the flaw of the anecdote as evidence.
Generally 
Parsimonious interpretations?
Parsimony of interpretation, though frequently advocated, is not a basic principle of science. If data cannot distinguish between alternative explanations the conclusion must be that both are possible, without a bias for the more parsimonious one. The reason why parsimony is nevertheless commendable in animal cognition is this: Our first naive interpretation tends to be the one we would apply to the behavior of another human, and most often it will attribute to the subject a mental state: "He has mislead her into believing that...". Thus the spontaneous, anthropomorphic interpretation is usually the most demanding we can think of: We (or our primate subject) cannot attribute intention to someone without also attributing to him causal knowledge that his chosen course of action will lead him to his goal. Since in principle we cannot think of any more cognitively demanding hypotheses than those we apply to social interactions spontaneously, all alternatives which we then must search are automatically more parsimonious. The call for parsimony is merely a necessary consequence of our anthropomorphic first choice. There are no scientific reasons for favoring the most parsimonious inter-pretation of an anecdote; listing the alternatives is all that is needed. To put it differently: We learn nothing by jumping straight at the politics level of interpretation because in doing so we simply project our everyday percepts for human behavior. It is no more than applying a prejudice. It is not wrong to favor a demanding hypothesis, it is just not productive.
By forestalling detailed research it deprives us of the opportunity to discover the fascinating social Umwelten and Innenwelten in which other species live.
In our last section, we want to address
The Social Intelligence hypothesis
The idea that primate intelligence was selected primarily by the demands of a complex social life is widely quoted in publications on primate social Another example is an experiment by STAMMBACH (1988) on longtailed macaques. In each of 8 groups, he trained one subordinate group member to produce food for the whole group from an apparatus. As a result, group members began to groom the producers significantly more often between tests, particularly those who benefited most from him. This response mechanism might be as simple as "Groom the animal near whom you were rewarded". A more demanding version might require that the food appears only after a specific act of the producer. It might even have generalized to grooming a conspecific that "causes" an array of events to happen, or to a wider reciprocating mechanism with several inputs and outputs. This is a testable case where ROZIN's ideas might apply. Our own generalized sense of social reciprocation might have its phylogenetic origin in some quite local type of exchange rather than in the broad emergence of a theory of mind. The interest of the ROZIN approach is that it could determine at which level of social cognition primates might have evolved superior abilities, and at which level they might have become transfered to non-social skills. It is this form of the social intelligence idea where the ethologist's knowledge of the social life of his animals is useful, but unfortunately, at one time, he would have to return from the field to pursue it in earnest.
We believe that the path of small experimental steps is far more elucidating than the flight of fancy at the exciting, anthropomorphic interpretation of the moment, because in following this path we must form a mental landscape of all possible hypotheses and their operationalisation. The deeper excitement requires patience. We appreciate the heuristic and publicistic value of the anecdote, but we fear that primate politics and Machiavellian stratagems might share the fate of the social intelligence "hypothesis": That they will rest at peace at a stage of infancy.
Summary
The paper expresses the authors' views on the growing interest in primate social cognition, particularly among descriptive primate ethologists. Its characteristics are the hope to extract cognitive interpretations from field anecdotes, the free use of intentional language, and the untested and so far untestable idea that primate intelligence was selected in social contexts. We believe that 1) To understand how the animal itself represents the structure of its group or its habitat is perhaps the most ethological ethology there is and well worth pursuing. The study of social cognition, in particular, has long been neglected.
2) However, it requires of ethologists that they learn from established cognitive science and integrate its categories with their own. This is an interdisciplinary enterprise.
3) A traditional inductive study begins with anecdotes, which then are translated into hypotheses, which in turn are subjected to empirical tests including experiments. Sociobiology began to publish hypotheses without tests; the social cognition move now goes on to publish anecdotes without hypotheses, with a strong penchant for anthropomorphic interpretations in terms of social manipulation. This is little more than applying human prejudice. Phylogenetic and cognitive insights will come from testing alternative levels of organization in an animal's social knowledge about the same behavioral interaction. The experiment is the largely unavoidable method. Examples are given.
4) The speculation of the social origin of primate intelligence is tentatively interpreted in two possible directions. A version based on ROZIN's (1976) view that generalized mammal intelligence evolved from context-specific "Adaptive Specializations" seems the more accessible to ethological thinking and method.
